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Contracts Of insurance which deliberately insure a person against liability to pay fines or
penalties have long been regarded as being contrary to public policy and therefore unlaw*l
and unenforceable. So entrenched is this view that these sorts Of contracts have not been a
standard part of insurance companies' offerings and the courts have not had to deal
specijically with any one-o# such contracts as might have existed.
Now several insurers are offering, as a fairly standard component Of their
corporate/business/commercial packages. cover against liability for fines and penalties which
may be imposed under certain pieces Of recent legislation, particularly environmental. health
and safety and consumer protection legislation.
This article examines the principles underlying the view that fines and penalties insurances
are unlawful, and discusses an alternative argument and its chances Of success in the context
of Resource Management Act o#ences.
I THE NEW INSURANCES
The new policies cover offences under (for example) the Resource Management Act 1991
CRMAD, the Building Act 1991, the Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992, the Fair
Trading Act 1986 and the Consumer Guarantees Act 1993. Typically they offer indemnities
against liability for fines and penalties incurred under those Acts, and in respect of the
costs of defending offence proceedings. Mostly they form part of the insurer's package for
companies and company directors - they are made up of separate company, company
reimbursement and directors' and officers' policies.
Cover is generally available only where the event or act constituting or giving rise to the
offence was:
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(i) unintended and unexpected; and
(ii) not the result of a deliberate or reckless disregard for the provisions of the Act or for
notices or orders made under the Act.
Some policies do not exclude intentional or expected acts. Frequently it will be a
condition of cover being available that the offender has used due diligence and taken all
reasonably practicable steps to avoid or diminish a claim under the policy.
II THE TRADITIONAL VIEW: CONTRARY TO PUBLIC POLICY
It appears there is no case where a court has considered the validity of a contract of
insurance which deliberately and expressly sets out to insure a person against liability to
pay (statutory) fines or penalties. Nor are there cases where, under a contract of insurance
to insure against liability generally for certain types of acts, an insured has claimed to be
indemnified for fines payable in consequence of those acts. Nevertheless it is usually
accepted that at common law a contract to insure against liability to pay fines and penalties
is contrary to public policy and void.
The basis for the accepted view is the maxim ex turpi oritur causa non oritur actio -
literally, "an action does not arise from a base cause". The maxim has been put in many
ways. For example.1
No Court will lend its aid to a man who founds his cause of action upon an immoral or an
illegal act. If, from the plaintiffs own stating or otherwise the cause of action appears to arise
ex turpi causa, ... there the Court says he has no right to be assisted... .
And:2
It has, I think, long been settled law that if an act is manifestly unlawful, or the doer of it
knows it to be unlawful, as constifuting either a civil wrong or a criminal offence, he cannot
maintain an action for contribution or for indemnity against the liability which results to him
therefrom. An express promise of indemnity to him for the commission of such an act is void.
Where the courts have considered the availability of an indemnity for the consequences
of civil wrongs, they have gradually moved away from a strict interpretation of the
principle, qualifying it so that it applies primarily to intentional or criminal acts. It has
been the natural nexus between criminal acts and o#ences that has led to the view that any
contract to insure against fines imposed for the commission of 0#ences is contrary to public
policy.
1 Holman u Johnson (1775) 1 Cowp 341,343.
2 Burrows v Rhodes [1899] 1 QB 816, 828.
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A Companies Legislation
The received common law position is reflected in the New Zealand companies legislation
in relation to the indemnification and insuring of company directors. Under s 204 of the
Companies Act 1995 ("1955 Act") and s 162 of the Companies Act 1993 ("1993 Act"), a
company is precluded from indemnifying or effecting insurance for its directors or employees
in respect of any criminal liability those persons might incur, or in respect of any costs they
might incur in defending any criminal proceedings (unless they are acquitted from such
proceedings).
B Comment
There is little detailed writing in support of the traditional view - probably because it
has been taken so much for granted. However, the authors of an Australian text on liability
3
insurance have this to say:
If the legislature, which is the arbiter of public policy, provides that an act or activity should
be visited with a penalty upon a person coming within a prescribed situation, then that
should not be mitigated by an insurer. .... Insofar as the legislation imposes a penalty as such,
the courts are unlikely, at least for some time, to look at the philosophical foundation of the
penalty in order to decide whether it may be the subject of indemnification by the policy. The
proper view should be that if the legislature invokes a penalty, then it should be borne by the
person upon whom it is imposed.
While no doubt it is possible and desirable to insure against liability to a third party for breach
of a statutory duty, which of course may also flow from such conduct, the position is different
in respect of a penalty no matter how large. It is the purpose of the particular act to inflict a
penalty on he who infringes, and if the penalty is made very large, the obvious purpose is that
it should act as a deterrent. It would run counter to the intention of the legislature if the
insured could divest himself of the punishment and its effects, by insurance.
And in the mid-1930s one British insurer issued a circular offering to insure motorists
against liability to pay fines for certain road traffic offences, most of them minor, but
including failure to stop at traffic signals and exceeding the speed limit. That drew the
following comment:4
It is obvious that to insure potential offenders against the penal consequences of their
breaches of the law is against public policy as tending to make punishment nugatory and as
encouraging persons in the very kinds of carelessness or even recklessness against which the
law, in the public interest, has attempted to impose safeguards.
3 Derrington and Ashton The Law of Liability Insurance (Butterworths, Sydney, 1990) 54.
4 "Insurance Against Fines" (1936) 100 JPLGR 248.
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It seems to us doubtful whether an insurance policy covering these risks is valid, but of course
such a class of insurance business could be successfully built up on good faith, the insurers
taking no advantage of the legal flaw in their contract. But, in our opinion, the plan of
insurance involves the commission of an offence. Offering to insure against this risk, and
issuing policies are acts to the public mischief.
The common law misdemeanour of doing an act to the public mischief must not be used too
freely. It is capable of almost indefinite extension. But if wasting police time on enquiries into
pretended crime is an act to the public mischief, a fortiori making idle the sanctions which
make police control of traffic effective is such an act.
We are inclined to go further and to suggest that insurers and insured are guilty of a
conspiracy to prevent or to defeat the course of public justice, which intends that the
punishment of fine shall attach to an individual and not be resolvable into a levy of
infinitesimal amount on each of a large number of persons who are strangers to him and the
transactions in which he has been concerned.
It may perhaps be regarded by the authorities as impolitic to invoke the ancient common law
to deal with the modern mischief. If so the sooner the matter is dealt with by Parliament the
better.
Derrington and Ashton, besides taking a less outraged stance on the behaviour of
insurers and insureds in contemplating such insurances, concede that the increase in
legislation imposing penalties in areas such as environmental protection will inevitably
give rise to questions about the correctness or appropriateness of the current common law
5
position.
III THE TRADITIONAL VIEW CHALLENGED
6
In 1983, in a paper to the Australian Legal Convention , Professor KCT Sutton has
suggested that there is no such blanket"external" prohibition on insurance against fines on
the ground of public policy. He discusses cases where the courts have qualified the ex turpi
causa principle in relation to insurance or indemnity for the civil consequences of criminal
acts. He concludes generally that similar qualifications should apply where there is a claim
for indemnity in respect of fines payable for the commission of statutory offences. He argues
that there is no overriding public policy justification for prohibiting all such insurances,
but rather that the public policy reasons for and against permitting indemnification differ
from case to case and that the decision as to indemnity should depend on the circumstances
of the particular case.
5 Above n 3,54.
6 "Insurance against Wrongdoing".
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A Fire and All Risks Insurance Co Ltd v Powell
Professor Sutton draws heavily on the judgment of the Supreme Court of Victoria in Fire
7
and All Risks Insurance Co Ltd v Powell. In that case a carrier had deliberately ignored a
statutory provision prohibiting the use of vehicles over a certain height on the roads except
under a special licence. He had driven his truck with a high load, without a permit, and in
doing so had encountered a bridge too low to allow the truck to pass safely under it. (If he
had obtained a permit it would have notified him that he could not drive safely on that
road.) Goods on the truck were damaged and the owner of the goods sued the carrier. The
carrier made a claim on his insurers. The insurers argued that:
(i) there was no indemnity because the carrier by his own wilful act had caused or
contributed to the loss in respect of which he claimed indemnity; and
(ii) as the loss arose in the course of the carrier's doing an intentionally illegal act the
carrier was, as a matter of public policy, precluded from recovering under his
insurance policy.
The insurers' first argument did not rely on the wilful act being an unlawful act. The
court accepted that:8
It is a fundamental term of all insurance law that the insured is debarred by an implied term
from recovering on the policy if he intentionally caused the loss or the event upon which the
insurance moneys were expressed to be payable.
but distinguished between an intentional act which produces intentional loss or damage
and an intentional act in the course of doing which unintended loss or damage occurs,
9
saying:
The true rule is that where the actual loss for which indemnity is sought is deliberately
contrived by the insured's wilful and deliberate act, he cannot recover under the policy, but
that his negligence does not bring him within that concept.
The insurer's argument failed. The court held that the proximate cause of the damage
was not the (unlawful) failure to obtain a permit, but driving the truck under the bridge.
That was a negligent, not an intentional act. Nor did the carrier intend to cause damage to
the goods on the truck. It is not contrary to the principles of insurance law to insure against
the (unintended) consequences of negligence.
7 [1966] VR 513.
8 Above n 7, 517.
9 Above n 7, 519.
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In relation to the second argument the court traversed a number of cases dealing with the
circumstances in which it is contrary to public policy to allow an insured to recover under
an insurance policy for liability to pay civil damages. It noted the conflict between two
broad and established principles of public policy:
(i) that persons who enter into contractual engagements should be required to fulfil
them (particularly where the contract is one of insurance in relation to a commercial
transaction, "for without insurance it would be difficult to carry on modern
commerce");
(ii) that no person ought to be able to recover in an action at law anything which in
substance will come to him as a benefit from his a·ime.
As to the latter principle, the court picks up from earlier, similar cases comments to the
effect that the rule is not by any means an inflexible one. For example, in Cleaver v Mutual
10
Reserve Fund L(fe Association the court had said:
... that the person who commits murder, or any person claiming under him or her, should be
allowed to benefit by his or criminal act, would no doubt be contrary to public policy. But this
doctrine ought not to be stretched beyond what is necessary for the protection of the public.
Lord Wright MR said in Beresford v Royal Insurance Co Ltd:11
While the law remains unchanged [ie the law which makes suicide a crime] the Court must
we think, apply the general principle that it will not allow a criminal or his representative to
reap by the judgment of the Court the fruits of his crime. We have quoted the above
authorities in support of that principle, which is of general import. The principle has been
applied not only in the authorities quoted above but also in many decisions dealing with
varied states of fact and applications of the same or similar principle. These are all illustrations
of the maxim ex turpi causa non oritur actio. The maxim itself, notwithstanding the dignity of
a learned language, is, like most maxims, lacking in precise definition. In these days there are
many statutory offences which are the subject of the criminal law, and in that sense are
crimes, but which would, it seems, afford no moral justification for a Court to apply the
maxim. There are likewise some crimes of inadvertence which, it is true, involve mens rea in
the legal sense but are not deliberate or, as people would say, intentional.
And in St John Shipping Corporation v Joseph Rank Ltdl2 Lord Devlin (then Devlin D had
questioned whether the rule applied at all to statutory offences.
10 [1892] 1 QB 147, 152.
1 1 [1937] 2 KB 197, 219.
1 2 [1957] 1 QB 267, 292.
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13
The Powell court concluded that:
...it is not the law that every act deliberately done and which is prohibited by law - whether
by the common law, by statute or by by-law or statutory regulation - and which is, whether
remotely or directly, causally connected with a loss which is the subject of indemnity under
an insurance policy, so operates on the contract of indemnity that the courts are bound on the
ground of public policy to deny to the actor the benefit of his contract. Such a doctrine would
be mischievous in the extreme.
14
It went on to say that:
...in every case, in which it is sought to avoid performance by one party to a contract of a
promise contained therein on the ground that public policy will not permit the law's processes
to assist a man to secure a benefit said to arise from his own criminal act, the court must
consider whether the act of the promisee is of such an anti-social character that the interests
of the public require that the courts should for their protection decline to enforce the
contract.
Again the insurers failed. The court considered that even if the damage had been caused
directly by the carrier's unlawful conduct in not obtaining a permit, that conduct was not so
grave or anti-social as to preclude indemnity for the loss that followed. The failure to
obtain a permit was not a crime in the sense that it would shock the conscience of
reasonable people or cause them to regard the carrier as a criminal. It was a breach of a
"mere" regulatory provision (it was in fact a breach of the Act, though the court obviously
considered the provision to be of "regulatory" character). The legislation provided for a
penalty, which was sufficient for the protection of the public. It was not going to help deter
future offenders for the court to refuse to allow the indemnity - most carriers would
consider it better to carry the goods safely than to be insured for their damage. The interests
of victims (those whose goods were harmed) were promoted by the existence of the
indemnity. The defendant though he knew he was breaking the law, did not expect to cause
anyone harm. Finally, the insurer could have excluded cover for losses incurred in the
course of a wilful infringement of the Act. It was unsatisfactory for the insurer, who had
contracted to insure and kept the premiums, to be able to refuse to honour his promise.
B Professor Sutton's Argument
Professor Sutton argues that the validity of policies to insure against fines should be
tested by the criteria laid down in Powell if the offences committed or fines imposed are the
unintended consequences of intended (or negligent or accidental) acts. If the consequences of
13 Above n 7, 523.
14 Above n 13.
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an act are intended, the cover will be precluded anyway - if not by the words of the policy,
by ordinary principles of insurance law relating to its construction.
He justifies that argument by pointing out that nowadays the breach of a statute is not
necessarily regarded as involving immorality or impropriety - especially where strict
liability is imposed and neither intention nor negligence is required to prove the breach.
Often strict liability is imposed not (or not primarily) for deterrent purposes, but for other
reasons, eg to provide a fund for repairing damage.
C Other Justifications
There are other reasons why the orthodox view might legitimately be challenged. A fine
will have no deterrent effect on a person who is convicted but in no way at fault. And it
would be punishment of a person society considers innocent. That concept is outside our
notions of justice and fairness. Furthermore we accept that negligence is a part of everyday
life, notwithstanding that society might prefer that it was not. On the whole people will
prefer to take care rather than to act carelessly and cause damage, even though that damage
is insured against. A fine imposed in those circumstances will have little more deterrent
effect than one imposed on a completely "innocent" person. As to whether Parliament's
intention to punish would be undermined by allowing insurance, it should not be forgotten
that persons insured will still be personally liable to pay premiums and deductibles. Those
are likely to be significant and to increase in size as more claims are made, so that repeat
offenders will be deterred.
The sorts of legislation for which insurance against fines is being offered has its greatest
impact on the industrial and commercial communities. As industry and commerce become
more highly regulated by statute there is a risk that if statutory penalties are not insurable,
businesses will fail or become excessively risk-averse. It is already a concern that the
increasing legal obligations being imposed on company directors, for example, will impact
adversely on their decision whether to serve or continue to serve on company boards.
Alternatively they may agree to serve but insist on overly cautious risk-reduction measures,
or even contract out the risky decisions to professional advisers. Companies will end up
being unable to create boards composed of dynamic, successful business leaders. The same
sorts of concerns arise outside of the corporate area in small business ventures. Enterprise
will be stifled. The certainty necessary for efficient business management will be
threatened.
IV APPLYING THE POWELL REASONING
If the New Zealand courts could be persuaded to reexamine the accepted common law
position and apply the principles that emerge from Powell, one would expect their approach
to be to accept that the policy is valid per se, to identify the particular circumstances in
which the insured claims an indemnity, and to weigh the public policy factors for and
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against allowing the indemnity in that particular case. The sorts of factors that might be
taken into account include, for example:
(i) The nature and gravity Of the illegal conduct - Is it a crime in the sense that it shocks the
conscience of reasonable people, or causes them to regard the offender as a criminal,
or as so anti-social that courts should decline to enforce the contract of insurance in
order to protect the public? Is the offence a truly criminal one, or is it regarded as a
regulatory or public welfare offence?
(ii) The extent to which allowing the indemnity will hinder any deterrent e#ect the law was
intended to have - If the provision was enacted purely or primarily for its deterrent
effect, will it actually deter the offender or future offenders if imposed in the
particular circumstances? Was the offending purely inadvertent, so that no punitive
response will be sure to prevent its recurrence? Is the opprobrium that attaches to
the conviction deterrent enough in itself?
(iii) The potential for encouraging similar future acts if the indemnity is allowed - Will those
insured under these policies prefer to cause damage and recover under their
insurance policies rather than to avoid the damage altogether? Are there other
sanctions that will make the offender prefer to avoid the damage - for example loss of
customer satisfaction, poor corporate image?
(iv) The purpose of the statutory provision that was infringed - Was it enacted purely or
primarily for deterrent purposes, or does it have some other objective? Provision in
the relevant Act for moneys recovered as fines to go to a "clean-up fund" may well
suggest another dominant purpose.
(v) The o#ender's knowledge of,Ricts or law making his conduct a crime - In subjective terms,
was the offender's conduct morally reprehensible, so that it warrants a punishment
that will be borne personally?
(vi) Whether enforcement of the indemnity would promote or be detrimental to the interests Of
innocent victims - Do the fine moneys go to a fund to repair damage caused by the
event insured against? Or to a general fund to promote the Act's purposes generally?
Or to fund education to prevent future offences? If so, will the offender be able to
pay the fine if the indemnity is not allowed?
The question is whether our courts, if and when they are confronted by the issue of the
validity of one of these policies, will be persuaded by arguments along the lines proposed by
Professor Sutton, or whether they will stick to the basic premise that all such insurances
are void from the beginning. Some indications may be available from cases already decided
under the offence provisions of the various statutes. So far as the Resource Management
Act 1991 ("RMA") is concerned there is already some useful guidance from the courts.
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V OFFENCES 1INDER THE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT ACT
Under s 338(1) of the RMA it is an offence to contravene or permit the contravention of
any of s 9 (use of land in contravention of district or regional plans), s 11 (restrictions on
subdivision), s 12 (restrictions on use of coastal marine areas), s 13 (restrictions on uses of
beds of lakes and rivers), s 14 (restrictions relating to water) or s 15 (discharge of
contaminants into the environment). Any person convicted of an offence under s 338(1) is
liable to a maximum term of imprisonment of 2 years or a fine of up to $200,000, and $10,000
15
per day while the offence continues.
16
Whether the defendant intended to commit the offence is irrelevant . A defence is
17
available where the contravening action or event was necessary, or beyond the control of
18
the defendant, provided in both cases that the effects of the action or event were
adequately mitigated or remedied by the defendant after it occurred.
Where an offence is committed by a person acting as agent or employee, the person's
principal is liable under the Act in the same manner and to the same extent as if he, she or it
had personally committed the offence, but in those circumstances a defence of no-fault is
available to the principal, again provided that the principal took all reasonable steps to
19
remedy any effects of the act or omission giving rise to the offence .
Where a company is convicted of an offence, every director and person concerned in the
management of the company is also guilty of the offence, if:
(i) the act that constituted the offence took place with their authority or permission or
consent; and
(ii) they knew or could reasonably be expected to have known that the offence was to be
20
or was being committed and failed to take all reasonable steps to prevent or stop it.
A The Machinery Movers Case
In Machinery Movers Ltd v Auckland Regional Council21 the High Court (Full Court)
considered an appeal against the sentence imposed by the District Court for breach of
15 RMA s 339(1).
16 RMA s 341(1).
17 RMA s 342(2)(a).
18 RMA s 341(2)(b).
19 RMA s 340.
20 RMA s 340(3).
21 [19941 1 NZLR 492.
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s 15(1)(b) of the RMA (discharge of a contaminant onto land in circumstances which
resulted in that contaminant entering water).
Machinery Movers Ltd ("MML") had been engaged to empty and remove a number of
storage tanks from a timber yard. The company that engaged MML had obtained written
permission from the Regional Council to discharge the contents of the tanks (described as
contaminated stormwater containing traces of zinc napthenate) into the Council's sewerage
system at the timber yard. Diluted zinc napthenate is comparatively harmless. MML saw
the Council's letter of permission.
MML's employees could not find the sewerage outlet manhole, so they discharged the
contents of the tanks onto the ground over a period of a day or so. One of the tanks in fact
contained serious levels of very toxic chemicals. One of MML's directors discovered that
fact at a fairly early stage in the discharge process but did nothing about it. The discharge
filtered into a nearby stream. Ducks died. Members of the public had to be treated for the
effects of the chemicals.
The District Court had convicted MML of an offence under s 15(1)(b) and had imposed a
fine of $25,000 and ordered MML to pay the costs of the prosecution, amounting to about
$11,000. MML had also paid the costs of cleaning up the spill.
MML argued that the fine was excessive. The High Court disagreed. In the course of
dealing with an argument by counsel that sentencing considerations under the RMA should
be similar to those under its predecessor Act (the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967)
the court said that the RMA was informed by a wholly different environmental philosophy
which places far greater emphasis on environmental protection and introduces a much more
stringent regime of penalties and punishment that did the 1967 Act:22
A power to imprison has been added and the maximum fine increased by one third from
$150,000 to $200,000. In addition, s340(2) of the RMA has introduced separate criminal liability
for company directors and managers of corporations subject to proof of lack of due diligence.
23
Those changes, the court said:
....constitute a clear legislative direction to the Courts to ensure that higher penalties are
imposed which will have a significant deterrent quality. If fines are too low, they will be
regarded as a mindr licence fee for offending and convey the idea that the law may be broken
with relative impunity.
22 Above n 21, 500, (emphasis added).
23 Above n 22.
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The court went on to consider what were the sentencing principles in pollution cases. It
24
took those primarily from R v Bata Industries Ltd, in which Bata and its directors were
convicted and fined under Ontario state legislation for causing a discharge into the natural
environment. Many of the matters considered relevant for sentencing purposes coincide
with the public policy factors which Professor Sutton suggests should determine the issue of
indemnification. It is useful to look at the position the court took on those matters.
25
By way of general overview, the Bata Court said, and the High Court agreed, that:
Breaches of these regulations and laws must be dealt with in such a fashion as to prevent
their repetition and to foster the principle of environmentally responsible corporate
citizenship.
The purpose of sentencing an offender is to protect the public, to deter and rehabilitate the
offenders, to promote compliance with the law, and to express public disapproval of the act.
There are unique sentencing considerations to bear in mind in public welfare offences, but
there can be no doubt that the protection of the public is the primary consideration in
sentencing in this field.
The High Court also agreed that the severity of the sentence should vary in accordance
with the nature of the environment affected, the extent of the damage, the deliberateness of
the offence, the attitude of the offender, and in the case of corporate offenders, the size,
wealth, nature of operations and power of the corporation, the extent of its attempts to
comply, remorse, profits realised by the offence, and the existence of a criminal record or
evidence of good character.
Protection of the public was seen as best achieved by general deterrence - by
emphasizing community disapproval of an act and branding it as reprehensible, but not by
making the penalty so severe that it will "over-deter" by making companies reluctant to
abate environmental damage. The Bata Court had also recognised the tension between
imposing punishments which might undermine a company's stability and protecting the
26
environment, and resolved that tension in favour of protection of the environment:
The message [corporations] receive from this sentence must be that even in this bleakest of
financial times, the environment must not be a sacrificial lamb on the altar of corporate
survival.
24 (1992) 9 OR ed) 329 (liability); 7 CELR (NS) 293 (sentencing). Discussed in Machinery Movers, above n 21,
502-506.
2 5 Above n 21, 503.
2 6 Above n 21, 504.
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With all of that the High Court agreed. More specifically, in Bata it had been ordered
under the terms of probation imposed that Bata was not to indemnify its directors for the
fines they had to pay. That condition was unsuccessfully appealed with the appeal court
holding that the objective of the executives' sentence required that they pay the fines
27
personally. Noting that the question of an indemnity was not one that was before it, the
High Court nevertheless expressed its general approval of the condition prohibiting an
28
indemnity, saying:
... it would be against public policy for the company to give an indemnity relating to the
criminal conduct of directors....If a director is acquitted indemnification is permissible in
respect of costs: s 204 of the Companies Act 1955. Condition 6 may have been included
because of the fact that the offences were public welfare offences only.
The High Court in Machinery Movers was persuaded to some extent by an argument that
the size of the penalty was out of proportion to the financial position of the company.
Counsel argued that the total financial impact of the penalty would inevitably place a
severe strain on the company's financial resources and might even push it over the financial
edge and cause it to cease trading. The court noted that the trial judge had taken into
account the company's financial position in arriving at the sentence and concluded that the
penalty was not excessive, but that it was important that the fine should not place the
company at risk, - "especially in the current climate where the continuation of employment is
so important". It amended the sentence to permit the fine to be paid in instalments over two
years.
B Machinery Movers and Sutton's View
Professor Sutton has argued that fines imposed for certain pollution offences ought to be
insurable. In particular he thought that insurance ought to be available where non-
compliance with minimum standards was accidental or negligent, or where it was
unrealistic to expect compliance with the governing legislation, for example, where it was
27 Bata further appealed the non-indemnification provision in the probation order. The decision of the Ontario
Court of Appeal on that further appeal (127 DLR (4th) 438) became available shortly after this article was
written. On appeal the non-indemnification provision was held inappropriate and was struck out, on the bases
that:
0) it was made for a collateral purpose (to punish two parties not subject to the order); and
(ii) the question whether an indemnity is available is one to be decided under corporations legislation.
The relevant legislation (s 136 of the Ontario Business Corporations Act RSO 1990, c B 16) provides that a
company may indemnify directors if the directors acted honestly, in good faith with a view to the best interests
of the corporation, and in the reasonable belief that their conduct was lawful.
28 Above n 21, 506.
r-
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prohibitively expensive for a company to eliminate every chance of pollution arising from
its activities (provided that what was being insured was contingent and not certain).
From dicta in Machinery Movers it seems unlikely that our courts will accept arguments
of that sort at least in the context of RMA offences. There is a defence under the RMA
where an act constituting an offence is beyond the control of the offender. Given the court's
determination that Machinery Movers should pay the full penalty imposed, even though
that might threaten the company's viability, it is difficult to see a later court accepting the
proposition that, if it is economically unrealistic for an offender to pay a fine, then this
should be grounds for condoning an indemnity from insurers.
There was no issue of indemnity or insurance in Machinery Movers. But the way in
which the court approached its sentencing function, and its obiter comment approving the
prohibition on indemnity in Bata, suggest that the factors which Professor Sutton argues
should go to the availability of indemnity were in fact taken into account in determining the
sentence. The High Court said, for example, that:
(i) The offence was a serious one, with particularly traumatic and severe effects, and one
which deserved public disapproval.
(ii) The incident ran wholly counter to the general purposes of the RMA.
(iii) The fine needed to be pitched at a level which would make it a real deterrent and not
risk it being regarded as a "licence fee".
(iv) The fine was still well below the maximum penalty under the Act.
(v) It was accepted that Machinery Movers had taken steps to mitigate or remedy the
effects of the discharge.
(Vi) The discharge was not intentional, but negligent, with unintended and unforeseen
consequences, but that did not mean there was a low level of moral culpability.
(Vii) It was accepted that Machinery Movers had already had to pay the clean up costs of
the incident, and that that in itself had some deterrent value.
(viii) It accepted that Machinery Movers was a small operation, but it did not for that
reason deserve to be treated more leniently.
The court set the level of the fine in recognition of those factors. And by refusing to
lessen the fine to preserve the financial viability of the company (even though it
acknowledged the imperative of protecting employment opportunities) the court indicated, at
least implicitly, indicated that these were fines which were intended to cause pain to the
offender itself. Even if an (uninsured) offender could not pay the fine without risking going
out of business, that would be dealt with, not by reducing the offender's personal liability
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(as fines and penalties insurances would), but by ameliorating the terms of payment. It may
therefore be of no avail to argue, for example, that the insured offender personally pays
premiums, and a deductible for each insured offence. Premiums and deductibles can be
pitched at a level that will not cause embarrassment for the insured. The penalty imposed
by the court is intended to do just that - to punish and deter the offender personally. And so
far as offences under the RMA are concerned they should probably, for the present at least,
be regarded as criminal offences (or at least public welfare offences so serious that they
warrant similar treatment), so that indemnities given or insurances effected to avoid their
consequences would be amongst those prohibited under the Companies legislation.
The same may not be true for all fines and penalties insurances. Courts may take a
different view of offences and penalties under other Acts for which fines insurance is now
being offered. Each Act and the decisions made under it will have to be examined
individually to see whether there is scope for arguing that the insurances are not
necessarily contrary to public policy.
VI CONSEQUENCES FOR COMPANIES EFFECTING FINES AND
PENALTIES INSURANCES
From the example of the RMA cases, it appears that insurance against liability for fines
is in fact insurance against the consequences of criminal acts and contrary to public policy.
If this is the case, what are the implications for a company taking out insurance of that kind
for itself and/or its directors?
In the first place the contract of insurance is likely to be void, either under the
Companies legislation, or under the Illegal Contracts Act 1970, or by a combination of the
provisions of both. Technically, the contract will be unenforceable against the insurer.
Directors who have entered into such contracts on behalf of their company or who have
caused their company to grant indemnities or effect insurance in breach of the Companies
legislation could face claims from shareholders or from the company. Directors may have to
29
pay the costs of the insurance personally. Otherwise there appear to be no sanctions
against companies or directors who might take insurance of this sort.
It is probably unlikely, except perhaps in the event of a change in company shareholding
or upon liquidation of a company, that there would be any internal company dispute over
the enforceability of an indemnity or the effecting of directors' and officers' insurance.
Similarly, except where an insurance company changes hands or goes into liquidation, it is
improbable that an insurer would refuse to honour a fines policy, because of the damage
that would do to its commercial reputation.
29 Section 204(8) of the Companies Act 1955; s 162(8) of the Companies Act 1993.
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Is the question whether these insurances are contrary to public policy then a purely
academic one? The answer must be that it is not. The courts are alive to the possibility of a
company indemnity in respect of fines payable by company directors, and they will almost
certainly soon come across an offender who is insured against liability for a fine. In either
case there is room for argument on the public policy issue, but for Resource Management Act
offences in particular, the chance of a move away from the accepted common law position is
probably remote.
